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Abstract. It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms’ costs as well as market 
power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose envi-
ronmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in the most actual 
regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultane-
ously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted itself to either of 
them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The 
article at hand accounts for closing this gap by investigating the welfare effects of 
emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control 
costs and a polluting asymmetric Cournot duopoly. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Asymmetric Cournot duopoly, external diseconomies of pollution, cost un-
certainty, emission standard, emission tax 
 
JEL Classification: D62, D89, L13, Q58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗
 I wish to thank Peter Michaelis, Ekkehard von Knorring, Peter Zerle, Thomas Ziesemer and the partici-
pants of the 5th workshop of the Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics for helpful comments and sug-
gestions. Needless to say, the usual disclaimer applies. 
Ψ
 Department of Economics, Universitätsstraße 16, D-86159 Augsburg, Germany 
Email: clemens.heuson@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de; Tel.: +49 (0) 821 598-4062; Fax: +49 (0) 821 598-4217 
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
The starting point of the present paper is the environmental problem in terms of exter-
nal diseconomies. More precisely, it considers the standard case of several firms emit-
ting a harmful pollutant in the course of their production and thus causing external 
damage costs. Trying to internalise the latter, the policy maker – below for simplifica-
tion referred to as environmental policy agency, short EPA – will frequently face the 
following two complications: Firstly, it is not equipped with all the information required 
to generate the welfare maximising allocation. Secondly, the polluting firms exhibit 
market power at least to some extent. Environmental economists realised at an early 
stage that these hitches crucially influence the optimal1 design and choice of emission 
control instruments. One stream of literature, initiated by the seminal papers of Weitz-
man (1974) along with Adar and Griffin (1976), deals with the question how uncertainty 
concerning damage and emission control costs affects the relative performance of 
emission standards, tradable emission licences and emission taxes. They showed that 
an additive shock to the marginal damage cost function leaves the basically given 
equivalence of these instruments unaffected,2 while a congruent shock to the marginal 
control cost function makes their comparative advantage dependant on the relative 
slopes of the two aforesaid functions.3 Another branch of literature analyses how mar-
ket power affects internalisation strategies. Buchanan (1969) started the discussion by 
pointing out that Pigouvian taxation might lead to suboptimal allocations when the pol-
luting firms possess market power, which means an additional distortion to the external 
diseconomies of pollution. A further milestone was set by Barnett (1980), who derived a 
rigorous (second best) Pigouvian tax rule tailored to the actuality of a monopolistic pol-
luter, followed by more sophisticated rules for symmetric (Ebert, 1992) as well as 
asymmetric Cournot oligopoly (Simpson, 1995). However, there were very few at-
tempts to compare emission control instruments against the background of market 
power, like e.g. Requate (1993a and b) undertook. 
All in all, the review of the respective literature reveals a considerable shortfall: It has 
very well been detected that both information problems on the part of the EPA and 
market power of the polluting firms play an essential role for the optimal design and 
choice of conventional environmental policy instruments (Requate, 2005, pp. 85ff). 
Though, it has been constantly ignored that they emerge in virtually every real problem 
of environmental regulation simultaneously. Recent work of Heuson (2008) took a first 
step in closing this gap by investigating the welfare effects of emission standards and 
taxes within a static partial framework subject to the EPA’s frequent information prob-
lem of uncertain emission control costs and a polluting symmetric Cournot oligopoly. It 
showed that the interaction between information problems and market power has in-
deed an impact on optimal environmental policy. 
The present paper sets on this research effort through abolishing the restrictive as-
sumption of identical polluting firms. Considering the case of an asymmetric Cournot 
                                                 
1
 In the remainder, “optimal” is used synonymously to “accomplishing the EPA’s goal of welfare maximisa-
tion”, if applicable subject to market power of the polluting firms and/or incomplete information. 
2
 Amongst others, the equivalence between standards, licences and taxes particularly presumes identical 
cost functions of the regulated firms; see e.g. Tisato (1994). 
3
 More precisely, the according policy rule first derived by Weitzman (1974) – in the following called the 
original Weitzman-rule – tells that the ranking of the mentioned instruments is determined by the relation of 
the marginal damage and the marginal minimised aggregate control cost function’s slope; see section 6. 
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duopoly, it demonstrates that the decision whether to choose standards or taxes4 might 
be wrong when based on the original Weitzman-rule, which presupposes perfect com-
petition and symmetry of firms. An adequate modification of this policy rule guarantee-
ing the optimal instrument choice is derived. In doing so, two further insights emerge: 
Firstly, the basically given superiority of tax policy in case of asymmetric polluters, 
which is owed a higher abatement efficiency compared to standards, can be com-
pletely reversed by the Weitzman-effect.5 Secondly, the degree of uncertainty plays a 
decisive role for the optimal instrument choice in opposite to the original Weitzman-
setting. 
The analysis starts out by contemplating the reference case of complete information. 
Section 2 sets up the model and displays the basic characteristics of the policy inter-
vention game. In section 3, the comparative analysis of instruments reveals the superi-
ority of the tax policy in the absence of uncertainty. Section 4 introduces the informa-
tion problem, whereupon section 5 investigates the instruments’ relative performance 
subject to uncertain control costs and derives the modification of the original Weitzman-
rule. Section 6 opposes the original to the modified rule, and section 7 finally summa-
rises results and gives a brief outlook on possible further research. 
 
 
2. The basic problem 
 
Consider a Cournot duopoly with firms 2,1i =  producing 1x  and 2x  units of a homoge-
neous good at costs amounting to ( ) ( ) 2iiiii x21xxcp +ζ= , whereas 21 ζ>ζ . The price 
of the good is determined by the linear inverse market demand function ( ) bXaXp −= , 
given the aggregate output 21 xxX += . In the course of production occur emissions of 
a harmful pollutant proportionally to the output level. Assume that the pollutant only 
emerges in the industry under consideration. 
Each firm can abate emissions either by decreasing the output level or by adopting an 
end-of-pipe technology, i.e. implementing a filter system. Thus, the individual amount of 
emissions actually discharged into the environment is ( ) eiieiii vxv,xem −ε= , ε  denoting 
the emission coefficient and eiv  the firm specific end-of-pipe abatement effort. The lat-
ter causes costs according to the function ( ) ( ) 2eieieie v21vvcc +γ= . Consequently, the 
asymmetry solely affects the firms’ production technology in a way that the related 
marginal costs of the inefficient firm 1i =  run parallel above the ones of the efficient firm 
2i = , given any output level.6 The monetary value of the damage emanating from the 
firms’ emissions is captured by the damage cost function ( ) ( ) ,EM21EMEMDC 2β+α=  
( )∑= i eiii v,xemEM  denoting the aggregate emission level. 
                                                 
4
 Naturally, it seems obvious to incorporate tradable licences which certainly belong to the most important 
conventional instruments. Yet, a realistic modelling of the former has to account for strategic effects on the 
licence market – due to the firms’ market power – and thus goes beyond the scope of the analysis. 
5
 The Weitzman-effect denotes the mechanism driving the difference between standards’ and taxes’ “costs 
of uncertainty”; see section 5. 
6
 Of course there is no reason why a firm should choose the technology causing higher production costs 
and providing no ulterior advantage. However, as the analysis focuses rather on the asymmetry’s impact 
on the optimal instrument choice than on its causes, this question is omitted for the sake of simplification. 
The same applies for modelling asymmetry moreover w.r.t. the end-of-pipe technology. 
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After all, let both the inputs for production and end-of-pipe abatement be produced at 
an exogenously given price on a perfectly competitive market. Thus each firm’s costs 
of production and end of-pipe abatement ( )ii xcp  and ( )eie vcc  coincide with the associ-
ated costs incurred by the society.  
Note that the specification of the demand and cost functions was chosen for two rea-
sons: On the one hand, it allows for an explicit solution of the model at all, on the other 
hand, it is necessary to reproduce the basic characteristics of Weitzman’s original set-
ting (see Weitzman 1974),7 which shall be exposed to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly. 
 
The Cournot-Nash-Equilibrium, short CNE, in the absence of regulation ( )0vx eCNCN =, 8 
results from the simultaneous solution of the firms’ profit maximisation problems 
 
[1] { } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )eieiiieiiiv,x vccxcpxXpv,xmaxeii −−=pi ,    2,1i =∀  
 
taking into account the Cournot conjecture.9 Clearly, the former deviates from the allo-
cation of the output and end-of-pipe abatement level ( )∗∗∗∗ vx ,  which maximises the 
partial welfare, defined as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus less costs of 
production, end-of-pipe abatement and environmental damage 
 
[2] { } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )∫ ∑ −+−= i eieii, EMDCvccxcpdXXp,Wmax evx vxe . 
 
This problem can be alternatively stated as to minimise the sum of aggregate control 
and damage costs, which will be helpful for the further proceeding: 
 
[3] { } ( ) ( )( ) ( )EMDCvccxCCmin i eieixi, ++∑eivx , 
 
whereas ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,xcpxcpdXXpxcpdXXpxCC
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denotes the aggregate costs of firm i’s output-reduction – the according loss of the con-
sumers’ and producers’ surplus.10 The failure of the market mechanism is initially 
driven by the external diseconomies of pollution and the firms’ market power, whose 
combined impact on the relation between the unregulated CNE and the first best solu-
                                                 
7
 Amongst others, the original setting implies linear aggregate marginal control and damage costs. The 
present framework generalises the original setting by explicitly distinguishing between two abatement 
options. 
8
 Subsequently, bold print variables denote vectors of firm specific variables, and the superscript “CN” 
marks the variables’ occurrence in the CNE. Note that due to the firms’ asymmetry it holds that CN2CN1 xx < . 
9
 For the second order condition of [1], the existence and uniqueness of the unregulated CNE see appen-
dix A1.  
10
 For the second order conditions of [2] and [3] see appendix A2. 
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tion is ambiguous.11 In addition, the asymmetric Cournot duopoly is noted for ineffi-
ciently allocating production between the firms: ( ) >∂∂
=
CN
11 xx
111 xxcp  
( ) CN
22 xx
222 xxcp
=
∂∂ .12 However, as will be seen in section 4, neither standards nor taxes 
are capable of resolving this inefficiency. Thus, solely the two first-mentioned distor-
tions give reason for the welfare maximising EPA to implement the instruments under 
consideration, except for the negligible case that they just cancel each other out. The 
procedure of the optimal instrument choice can be described as a sequential game, 
whose timing is depicted in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Timing of the policy intervention game 
 
First of all, the nature determines the firms’ type, i.e. their cost functions. The EPA, 
since usually endowed with sovereign authority and thus in the position of the Stackel-
berg-leader, chooses whether to implement emission standards or taxes (stage I). After 
having specified the design of the chosen instrument in stage II, the EPA offers the 
pursuant occurrence of the standard or tax in terms of a contract to  the firms, whose 
single decision is to comply with environmental regulation or not – i.e. to accept or re-
ject the contract (stage III). Subsequently, it is taken for granted that the EPA can moni-
tor the firms’ emission levels without any costs and enforce compliance by charging a 
sufficiently high fine in case that the firms reject.13 So any kind of moral-hazard problem 
can be ruled out and the firms will always accept the contract, which enables to skip 
stage III throughout the further analysis. Finally (stage IV), the firms meet the demands 
of the instrument at hand, i.e. render the adequate abatement effort and if applicable 
pay the tax obligation. Beyond, the according welfare level occurs. The analysis com-
mences by supposing that all the functions and moves listed above are common knowl-
edge to the parties involved. Naturally, the game will be solved for the subgame perfect 
equilibrium, short SPE, using backwards induction.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11
  The stronger the distortion of pollution, i.e. the higher β  (or ε ),  the smaller/larger is the welfare maxi-
mising output/end-of-pipe abatement level relatively to the one of the unregulated CNE: ( )( ) 0xx CNii <β∂−∂ ∗∗ / ( )( ) 2,1i,0vv eCNiei =∀>β∂−∂ ∗∗ . 
Contrary, as the distortion of output shortage gains weight, which is the case for an increasing level of the 
marginal willingness to pay (fading out pollution), the welfare maximising output grows relatively to the 
unregulated CNE: ( )( ) 2,1i,0axx
0
CN
ii =∀>∂−∂
=ε
∗∗ (while of course 2,1i,vei =∀  remains unchanged). 
12
 For the proof see appendix A3. 
13
 To prevent rejection, the fine has to meet at least the firms’ compliance costs of the respective instru-
ment. As the specification of the adequate fine yields tedious expressions but no further insight it is omit-
ted. 
EPA chooses  
the instrument 
EPA specifies the 
instrument’s design 
Firms accept 
(or reject) 
Emission levels 
and pay-offs occur 
t 
Stage I Stage IV Stage III Stage II Stage 0 
Nature determines 
the firms’ type 
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3. Optimal instrument choice with complete information 
 
The analysis restricts to that SPE which comprises positive output and end-of-pipe 
abatement levels of both firms (inner solution), since this is the sole constellation allow-
ing for the simultaneous appearance of the complications under regard: The distortions 
arising from the duopolistic market structure and, later on, control cost uncertainty.14 
Moreover, this kind of inner solution implies that the distortion of pollution outweighs 
the one of duopolistic output shortage – both a subgame perfect standard and tax in-
ducing a positive end-of-pipe abatement effort necessarily lead to a decrease of the 
firms’ output compared to the unregulated CNE as well.15 
 
Backwards induction starts out with stage IV, deriving the firms’ responses and equilib-
rium quantities for a given standard or tax. The firms aim at minimising their overall 
compliance costs of regulation. In case of emission standards, the EPA prescribes a 
particular emission quantity q to each firm,16 whose problem consequently reads 
 
[4] { } ( ) ( ) ( ) qv,xem.t.svccxccmin eiiieieixiv,x eii =+ . 
  
Thereby ( ) ( ) ( ),v,x,xv,xcc eCNiCNjiieCNiiixi pi−pi= CNx  ji,2,1j,i,xx CNii ≠=∀<  
 
represents the firms’ control costs concerning the option of output reduction, which 
simply amount to the respective loss of profit relatively to the unregulated CNE. The 
corresponding first order condition 
 
[5] ( ) ( ) ( )( ),qxqxccxxcc iieiixi −ε∂−ε∂ε=∂∂−     2,1i =∀  
 
stipulates to equal the firm specific marginal costs of the two abatement options. By 
solving for the response functions ( ) ( ) ji,2,1j,i,x,qrv,x,qrx jeiji ≠=∀ , it becomes evident 
that the firms fix the output and end-of-pipe abatement effort simultaneously, such that 
both serve as channels of strategic interaction. Define the quantities occurring in the 
standard regulated CNE as ( ) ( )qv,qx eCNiCNi  and ( ) 2,1i,qqemCNi =∀= .17 
Facing an emission tax, the firms have to pay a fee t per emission unit discharged into 
the environment and thus aspire to 
 
[6] { } ( ) ( ) ( ),v,xtemvccxccmin eiiieieiiv,x eii ++      2,1i =∀  
 
                                                 
14
 As will be seen in section 4, uncertainty only emerges for a positive end-of-pipe abatement effort due to 
the modelling. 
15
 The specification of the parameter restrictions which guarantee the inner solution is neglected with the 
same reasoning as in footnote 13.   
16
 The modus of a uniform absolute emission standard is chosen for two reasons: Firstly, it is the stan-
dards’ prototype taken for granted in the respective literature (see Helfand, 1991, p. 622) and thus allows 
for the comparability of results. Secondly, it keeps the model tractable and yet enables to capture the 
standards’ inherent inefficiency which emerges when polluters are heterogeneous. 
17
 For the second order condition of [4], the existence and uniqueness of the standard regulated CNE see 
appendix A4. 
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Contrary to standards, the firms now choose the output and end-of-pipe level in two 
separate steps, so as to the related marginal costs are equalised with t: 
 
[7] ( ) ( ) .tvvcc;txxcc eieieiixi =∂∂ε=∂∂−     2,1i =∀  
 
Consequently, there is only strategic interaction w.r.t. the output decision. Solving [7] 
yields the firms’ response functions ( ) ( ) ji,2,1j,i,trv,x,trx eiji ≠=∀  and at last the tax regu-
lated CNE’s quantities ( ) ( ) ( ) 2,1i,tem,tv,tx CNieCNiCNi =∀ .18 
 
Next (stage II), the EPA determines the instruments’ design which minimises the total 
costs [3], anticipating the equilibrium outcome of the final stage. The optimal standard 
solves the problem 
 
[8] ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )q2DCqvccqxCCmin
i
eCN
i
eCN
i
x
iq
++∑ , 
 
satisfying the first order condition19 
 
[9] ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∂
∂
=
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
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

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∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∂
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−∑ q
q2DC
q
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q
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qxCC
i
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i
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i
eCN
i
CN
i
CN
i
x
i
, 
 
which tells to choose q in a way, that the additional aggregate control costs of a mar-
ginal decrease in q (left hand side of [9]) are balanced with the according saving of 
damage costs (right hand side of [9]). 
Analogously, the optimal tax can be derived out of 
 
[10] ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )tEMDCtvcctxCCmin CN
i
eCN
i
eCN
i
x
it
++∑ , 
 
at which it is assumed that the tax revenue will be redistributed lump sum to the con-
sumers. The resulting first order condition20 
 
[11] ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
∗∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∂
⋅∂
−=
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
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

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∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∂
∂
∑ t
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eCN
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i
CN
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i
 
 
has exactly the same meaning as [9] – of course referred to an marginal increase in t.  
 
Finally (stage I), the EPA decides whether to implement taxes or standards by compar-
ing the level of total costs associated with ∗t  and ∗q . The respective cost difference is21 
                                                 
18
 For the second order condition of [6], the existence and uniqueness of the tax regulated CNE see ap-
pendix A5. 
19
 For the second order condition and the explicit solution see appendix A6. 
20
 For the second order condition and the explicit solution see appendix A7. Furthermore it can be shown 
that the optimal tax is below the Pigou-level, which is owed to the additional distortion of market power and 
corresponds to the standard result of Barnett (1980). Simpson (1995) found that in an asymmetric Cournot 
duopoly the opposite case can apply under certain conditions. However, these do not apply here. 
21
 For the proof see appendix A8. 
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[12] 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ,0q2DCqvccqxCC
tEMDCtvcctxCC
i
eCN
i
eCN
i
x
i
i
eCN
i
eCN
i
x
i
C
<++−
−++=∆
∑
∑
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
 
 
leading immediately to 
 
Proposition 1: With complete information, the optimal emission tax is strictly superior 
to the optimal emission standard (SPE). 
 
The reasoning for the superiority of taxes in case of complete information can be fol-
lowed by means of the subsequent figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Instrument specific abatement effort of the firms 
 
Figure 2 depicts the marginal costs of the two abatement options at choice occurring 
on the firm and aggregate level, contingent on the individual abatement efforts of the 
firms eiv  and 2,1i,xx,xemv CNiiiCNixi =∀<ε−= .22 Thereby the latter represents the 
amount of emissions that firm i abates by diminishing output. The maximal amount of 
emission that can be abated by each firm with any option is naturally 2,1i,emCNi =∀ . 
Remember that due to the assumption of a perfectly competitive market for the end-of-
pipe inputs a marginal increase of each firm’s end-of-pipe abatement effort raises the 
firms’ and the aggregate costs by the same amount: ( ) 2,1i,vcc eie =∀∂⋅∂ . Additionally 
applies that ( ) ( ) e2ee1e vccvcc ∂⋅∂=∂⋅∂  for e2e1 vv = , because both firms implement the 
same end-of-pipe technology. In contrast, abating one additional emission unit via out-
put reduction causes a higher cost augmentation in aggregate terms (loss of consum-
ers’ and producer’s surplus) than for the single firm (loss of producer’s surplus): 
( ) ( ) ,xccxCC ixiixi ε∂⋅∂−>ε∂⋅∂−  2,1i =∀ . Logically, it is more costly for the society when 
the efficient firm accomplishes this measure, i.e. ( ) ( ) 1x12x2 xCCxCC ε∂⋅∂−>ε∂⋅∂− , 
whereas ( ) ( ) =ε∂⋅∂− 22x22 xCC  ( ) ( )21x12 xCC ε∂⋅∂− . Due to the type of production tech-
nologies used by the firms, the latter’s marginal control costs of output reduction coin-
                                                 
22
 For the proof of the functions’ progress see appendix A9. 
Firms‘ optimisation facing q(V), leading to quantities ( )( ) ( )( ) 2,1i,Vqv,Vqv eCNixCNi =∀  
Firms‘ optimisation facing t(V), leading to quantities ( )( ) ( )( ) 2,1i,Vtv,Vtv eCNixCNi =∀  
( )Vt  
e
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e
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x
2 xcc ε∂⋅∂−
( ) e1e vcc ∂⋅∂ ( ) e2e vcc ∂⋅∂( ) 1x1 xCC ε∂⋅∂− ( ) 2x2 xCC ε∂⋅∂−
CN
1em
CN
1em
CN
2em
CN
2em
x
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cide: ( ) ( ) 2x21x1 xccxcc ε∂⋅∂=ε∂⋅∂  for 21 xx = .23 After all, the specification of the model 
leads to linearity of all the marginal control cost functions described above. 
Next, in order to make standards and taxes comparable, define ( )Vq  and ( )Vt  as that 
specifications of the former which enforce an overall abatement effort to the amount of 
V. These can be computed by solving ( ) q2EMqV CN −=  for q respectively 
( ) ( )tEMEMtV CNCN −=  for t.24 In case of ( )Vt , the emissions abated via end-of-pipe as 
well as the ones abated via output reduction coincide for both firms, i.e. 
( )( ) ( )( )VtvVtv eCN2eCN1 =  and ( )( ) ( )( )VtvVtv xCN2xCN1 = , because these adopt their identical 
marginal control costs to the uniform tax rate t. On the contrary, the emission standard, 
prescribing the same emission level to both firms, induces a relatively higher abate-
ment effort of firm 2, since it produces and thus emits more in the unregulated CNE: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )VqvVtvVqv eCN1eCN2,1ieCN2 >> =  and ( )( ) ( )( ) >> = VtvVqv xCN2,1ixCN2  ( )( )Vqv xCN1 . 
 
This reveals immediately the higher abatement efficiency of taxes compared to stan-
dards for given V. ( )Vt  yields identical end-of-pipe abatement efforts and thus bal-
ances the associated marginal costs. Indeed the firms’ output shortage induced by 
taxation is congruent as well, entailing however that the allocative inefficiency of pro-
duction within the unregulated CNE remains unchanged – recall that both firms’ mar-
ginal costs of production possess the same slope. Hence, the aggregate marginal 
costs of output reduction are higher in case of the efficient firm 2 as against to the inef-
ficient firm 1. Enforcing V through standard policy causes higher aggregate abatement 
costs compared to taxes for two reasons: Firstly, the marginal end-of-pipe costs di-
verge as the firms render different end-of-pipe abatement efforts, which provides a cost 
saving potential. Secondly, standards increase the allocative inefficiency of production, 
since the efficient firm decreases and the inefficient firm increases the output opposite 
to the levels under taxation.25 
 
Based on the linearity and congruence of the firms’ marginal control costs and by defi-
nition of ( )Vq  along with ( )Vt , it holds that ( )( ) ( )( )∑∑ = i eCNii eCNi VqvVtv  and 
( )( ) ( )( )∑∑ = i xCNii xCNi VqvVtv . These relations combined with the progress of the option 
specific aggregate marginal control cost functions imply that a marginal raise of V 
causes the same augmentation in aggregate control costs – no matter if induced by 
standards or taxes:26  
 
[13]     
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23
 This congruence is owed to the fact that the firms’ marginal costs of production possess the same slope. 
24
 Note that ( )Vt  corresponds to the (horizontal) aggregation of the firms’ marginal control costs because 
of [7]. 
25
 For the proof and comparison of the allocative inefficiency w.r.t. the standard and tax regulated CNE see 
appendix A10. 
26
 For the proof see appendix A11. 
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Thereby ( )VMCC  denotes the aggregate marginal control cost function which is realis-
able for the EPA when adopting standard or tax policy. As of course ( )Vq  and ( )Vt  
evoke the same damage costs ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2CNCN VEM21VEMVDC −β+−α= , [9] and [11] 
can be alternatively posed as to equate ( )VMCC  with ( ) ( ) VVDCVMDC ∂∂−= , leading 
to the direct corollary 
 
[14] ( ) ( ) ∗∗∗ == VtVqV  
 
Consequently, the advantage in terms of abatement efficiency of ( )Vt  over ( )Vq  ap-
plies for the optimally designed instruments as well, as both ∗t  and ∗q  induces the 
same overall abatement effort, which is the rationale for proposition 1.27 
 
Opposing the marginal control costs occurring on the firm and aggregate level enables 
furthermore to set up 
 
Proposition 2: Both standards and the taxes fail to enforce the welfare maximising 
allocation. 
 
Achieving the welfare maximum obviously requires to render the overall abatement 
effort efficiently from an aggregate perspective. This again is grounded on two condi-
tions that are both hurt by standards as well as taxes. 
The first condition is intra-firm-efficiency, demanding that the aggregate marginal con-
trol costs of the two options are balanced for each firm: ( ) ( ) ,vccxCC eieixi ∂⋅∂=ε∂⋅∂−  
2,1i =∀ . However, the firms’ cost minimisation, no matter whether facing the standard 
or tax policy, leads to ( ) ( ) ,vccxcc eieixi ∂⋅∂=ε∂⋅∂−  2,1i =∀  (see [5], [7]) and thus hurts 
the intra-firm-efficiency condition: ( ) >ε∂⋅∂− ixi xCC ( ) ,vcc eie ∂⋅∂  for ( )( )Vqvv xCNixi =  re-
spectively ( )( )Vtvv xCNixi =  and ( )( )Vqvv eCNiei =  respectively ( )( ),Vtvv eCNiei =  2,1i =∀ .28 
The market power enables the firms to shift a part of the control costs upon the con-
sumers via the abatement option of output shortage. Hence, the latter is overused, 
against what the end-of-pipe abatement effort is too low from a welfare perspective. 
Secondly, the overall abatement has to be allocated efficiently among the firms, such 
that ( ) ( ) 2x21x1 xCCxCC ε∂⋅∂−=ε∂⋅∂−  and ( ) ( ) e2ee1e vccvcc ∂⋅∂=∂⋅∂  (inter-firm-
efficiency). Yet, as demonstrated both standards and taxes lead to ( ) <ε∂⋅∂− 1x1 xCC  
( ) 2x2 xCC ε∂⋅∂− for ( )( ) ( )( ) 2,1i,VtvvlyrespectiveVqvv xCNixixCNixi =∀== .  Moreover, stan-
dards additionally hurt the second equity, since they entail ( ) ( ) e1ee2e vccvcc ∂⋅∂>∂⋅∂  for 
( )( ) 2,1i,Vqvv eCNiei =∀= . 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Of course the damage costs are the same for ∗t  and ∗q . 
28
 This is an immediate consequence of the marginal cost functions’ progress proved in appendix A9. 
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4. Introducing uncertainty 
 
One information problem that the EPA faces frequently when it tries to determine the 
optimal standard and tax is uncertainty with respect to the firms’ control costs. The lat-
ter is modelled following the seminal works of Weitzman (1974) along with Adar and 
Griffin (1976), who investigated an additive shock to the aggregate marginal control 
cost function.29 Suppose that the uncertainty enters through the end-of-pipe control 
costs as follows:30 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,2,1i,v21vuu,vcc 2eieieie =∀++γ=  whereas u is a continuous 
random variable with expectation [ ] 0uE =  and thus [ ] [ ]2uEuVar = .31 Hence, the uncer-
tainty solely affects the level, but not the slope of the marginal end-of-pipe control cost 
function ( ) ( ) 2,1i,vuvu,vcc eieieie =∀++γ=∂∂ . It is straightforward to show that this 
kind of uncertainty also translates into an additive shock to the aggregate marginal con-
trol costs ( )u,VMCC , see [13], and thus corresponds to the original Weitzman-setting.32 
Concerning the precise information structure, it is taken for granted that the EPA 
merely knows the distribution of u – which needs not to be specified for the further 
analysis – against what the firms are acquainted with the latter’s true specification: So 
the firms can perfectly observe the nature’s move in stage I against what the EPA 
builds beliefs concerning the firms’ type. Consequently, now the relevant equilibrium 
concept is the Bayes-Nash equilibrium (short BNE). The structure of the policy inter-
vention game does neither allow for Bayesian updating nor for problems of asymmetric 
information, because the firms cannot exploit their advance in information. It is pre-
sumed that the feasible value range of the random variable is sufficiently small in order 
to guarantee that the BNE comprises an inner solution as well.33 The modelling of un-
certainty along with this assumption guarantee apparently that the second order condi-
tions, the existence and uniqueness of both the standard and the tax regulated CNE 
still hold with analogous reasoning as under complete information and thus need not to 
be proved any more. 
 
 
5. Optimal instrument choice with uncertain control costs 
 
As a matter of course, the firms’ problem of minimising their compliance costs remains 
unchanged since the uncertainty only pertains to the EPA. Subsequently, the equilib-
rium outcome of stage IV can be calculated according to [4] - [7]. From the EPA’s view, 
in case of standards the equilibrium output and end-of-pipe abatement level are ran-
dom while the emission level is certain ( ) ( ) ( ) )2,1i,qqem,u,qv,u,qx( CNieCNiCNi =∀= . 
Though, tax policy leads to a deterministic output, but to an uncertain end-of-pipe 
                                                 
29
 An additive shock does not only facilitate the exposition, but ”…has also considerable economic content 
since factor price variations in inputs subject to a Leontief production function would produce additive er-
rors” (Adar and Griffin, 1976, p. 184). 
30
 Note that modelling the uncertainty to enter the end-of-pipe costs reduces the analysis’ degree of comp-
lexness considerably: It involves the introduction of one only random variable, as both firms use the same 
end-of-pipe technology, unlike the case of production cost uncertainty. 
31
 Not only u itself, but every function entered by u is a random variable. In order to highlight this insight, u 
will be explicitly listed as an argument of these functions. 
32
 For the proof see appendix A12. 
33
 Listing u’s feasible range of values explicitly is very cumbersome but yields no further insights. 
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abatement and emission level ( ) ( ) ( ) )2,1i,u,tem,u,tv,tx( CNieCNiCNi =∀ . This difference 
arises for the reason that the firms choose the output quantity and the end-of-pipe 
abatement effort simultaneously when facing standards, but separately when facing 
taxation, as seen above. 
Presumed that the EPA is risk neutral, it now chooses q and t in stage II such that the 
expectation of total costs is minimised, given the firms’ (in part) random responses of 
stage IV. The respective problem for standards reads:34 
( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ] ( ).q2DCu,u,qvccu,qxCCEmin]15[
i
eCN
i
eCN
i
x
iq
++∑
 
 
Naturally, the first order condition tells to equate the expected aggregate marginal con-
trol costs and the marginal damage costs related to an infinitesimal decrease in q: 
 
[16] ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
=














∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∂
∂
− ∑ ∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
i E
EeCN
i
EeCN
i
EeCN
i
eECN
i
CN
i
ECN
i
x
i
q
u,qv
u,qv
u,qvcc
q
u,qx
u,qx
u,qxCCE  
  
( )
∗
∗
∂
∂
= E
E
q
q2DC
. 
 
Implementing taxation, the EPA solves 
 
[17] ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]( )u,tEMEDCu,u,tvccEtxCCmin CN
i
eCN
i
eCN
i
x
it
++∑  
 
by setting t such that 
 
[18] ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
=













∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∂
∂
∑ ∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
i E
EeCN
i
EeCN
i
EeCN
i
e
E
ECN
i
ECN
i
ECN
i
x
i
t
u,tv
u,tv
u,u,tvccE
t
tx
tx
txCC
 
  
( )[ ]( )
( )[ ]( )
( )[ ]( )
,
t
u,tEME
u,tEME
u,tEMEDC
E
ECN
ECN
ECN
∗
∗
∗
∗
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=  
 
with an analogous interpretation as [16].35 
 
The relevant criterion for the optimal instrument choice under uncertainty (stage I) is 
obviously the expected level of total costs generated by the – in terms of expectation – 
optimal tax and standard. Setting up the associated difference leads to 
 
[19] 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) =





++−
−++
=∆
∑
∑
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
i
EEeCN
i
eECN
i
x
i
i
ECNEeCN
i
eECN
i
x
iEC
q2DCu,u,qvccu,qxCC
u,tEMDCu,u,tvcctxCC
E  
                                                 
34
 “E” denotes subsequently the expectation operator, and – when used as a superscript – means “in terms 
of expectation”. 
35
 Note that due to the assumption [ ] 0uE = the optimal design of the instruments coincides for complete 
and incomplete information, i.e. ∗∗ = Eqq  and ∗∗ = Ett . 
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  [ ] C22 2uVar ∆−




µ
µ−βφ= , 
 
with 0>µ  denoting slope of the aggregate marginal control cost function and 0>φ  
representing a term influencing the latter’s level.36 
As can be seen easily, the sign of the expected cost difference is ambiguous contrary 
to [12], implying the policy rule (in what follows referred to as the modified Weitzman-
rule) 
 
[20] [ ]
[ ]




⇒φ
∆µ
+µ<β<
⇒φ
∆µ
+µ>β>
∆
taxquota
uVar
2if,0
taxquota
uVar
2if,0
2
C2
2
C2
EC
p
f
    (BNE) 
 
which stipulates to prefer standards to taxes when β  is sufficiently large, i.e. the mar-
ginal damage cost function runs sufficiently steep, and vice versa. All in all, the ranking 
of the instruments is determined by three effects: 
Firstly, the lower abatement efficiency of standards )0( C >∆  which has been revealed 
for complete information still applies in the event of uncertainty and thus affects the 
instruments’ relative performance in favour of taxes. 
The second effect relates to the instrument specific costs of uncertainty – the costs 
emerging from the deviation between the random variable’s true value and the expec-
tation of the EPA. As Weitzman (1974) showed first, these costs depend crucially on 
the relation between the absolute slopes of the aggregate marginal control and dam-
age cost function, µ  and β . The intuition for this so-called Weitzman-effect shall be 
illustrated by the ensuing figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Weitzman-effect for u>0 
                                                 
36
 More precisely: ( ) VuV,MCC ∂∂=µ , ( ) 0Vuu,VMCC =∂∂=φ , see also appendix A12. 
a) µβ >  
V  
marginal 
costs 
 
( )VMDC  
 
( )[ ]u,VtE  
 
( )u,VMCC  
 
∗Et  
( )u,tV E∗  ( )∗EqV  
( )u,Vt  
 
∗V  
( )[ ]u,VMCCE  
 
b) µβ <  
V  
( )VMDC  
 
( )[ ]u,VMCCE  
 
( )u,VMCC  
 
∗Et  
∗V  ( )u,tV E∗  ( )∗EqV  
marginal 
costs 
 
( )[ ]u,VtE  
 
( )u,Vt  
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Figure 3 depicts the first order conditions for the optimal standard and tax under uncer-
tainty [16] and [18], alleging for instance that the true value of the random variable is 
positive )0u( > .37 With analogous reasoning as for complete information, both ∗Eq  and 
∗Et  balance the expectation of the aggregate marginal control costs ( )[ ]u,VMCCE  and 
the marginal damage costs ( )VMDC , each contingent on V. As the aggregate abate-
ment effort can be accurately controlled by standards, ( )∗EqV  is determined out of the 
intersection between ( )[ ]u,VMCCE  and ( )VMDC . Clearly, due the EPA’s erroneous 
expectation ( )∗EqV  deviates from the optimal aggregate abatement effort ∗V  that could 
be obtained by means of standards (and taxes) under complete information through 
equating the true marginal aggregate control costs ( )u,VMCC  with ( )VMDC . The re-
sulting overall cost saving potential, respectively the standard’s costs of uncertainty, is 
congruent to the dark shaded area and can be computed as follows 
 
[21] ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )∫
∗
∗
−=
∗
EqV
V
E dVVMDCu,VMCCu,qCU . 
 
As the firms’ and the aggregate marginal control costs diverge, ∗Et  results from plug-
ging the aggregate abatement effort which is expected to be optimal, ( )∗EqV , into the 
horizontal aggregation of the expected firm specific marginal control costs ( )[ ]u,VtE . 
For the reason that the firms’ cost minimisation endeavour involves the congruence of t 
and ( )u,Vt , ∗V  is failed again which becomes manifest in the tax’s costs of uncertainty 
 
[22] ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )∫
∗
∗
−=
∗
V
u,tV
E
E
dVu,VMCCVMDCu,tCU , 
 
corresponding to the light shaded area. Now consider the linkage between the instru-
ment specific costs of uncertainty and the slopes of ( )u,VMCC  and ( )VMDC . If the 
marginal damage costs run steeper than the aggregate marginal control costs ( µ>β , 
figure 3a) it holds that ( ) ( )u,tCUu,qCU EE ∗∗ < : In case of µ  being relatively small, al-
ready an insignificant error of the EPA, i.e. the true value of u only slightly deviates 
from zero, leads to a rather large difference between ∗V  and ( )u,tV E∗ . Since moreover 
the damage costs react sensitively to variations of the aggregate abatement effort due 
to comparatively large β , the Weitzman-effect brings forward standards, which enable 
an accurate control of V. The economic intuition for the opposite constellation  
( ) ( )u,tCUu,qCU EE ∗∗ >  when µ<β (figure 3b) becomes clearest through conceiving the 
extreme case of a horizontal marginal damage cost function )0( =β . Here the EPA can 
enforce ∗V  despite its lack of information by simply adjusting the tax rate to the axis 
intercept of the marginal damage cost function α . The firms will then for sure generate 
                                                 
37
 For the proof of the functions’ progress see appendix A13. 
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∗V in opposite to standards. This advantage of the tax policy persists as long as µ<β . 
Note that the revealed relations between the instruments’ costs of uncertainty hold for 
any allowed occurrence of u and consequently as well for the expected costs of uncer-
tainty as a whole, such that 
 
[23] ( ) ( )[ ] [ ]



µ<β<
µ>β>






µ
µ−βφ=− ∗∗
,0
,0
2
uVaru,qCUu,tCUE 2
2EE
. 
 
Thirdly, the degree of uncertainty measured by [ ]uVar  influences the optimal instru-
ment choice through determining the significance of the Weitzman-effect. As [20] dis-
closes, µ>β  on its own is not a sufficient condition for the superiority of standards – to 
overcompensate the advantage of taxation w.r.t. the higher abatement efficiency, 
[ ]uVar  needs to be sufficiently large.38 
These insights concerning the optimal instruments’ choice under uncertainty can be 
summed up to 
 
Proposition 3: The ranking of emission standards and taxes is ambiguous when con-
trol costs are uncertain. For a sufficiently steep marginal damage cost function and a 
sufficiently high degree of uncertainty, the Weitzman-effect can reverse the taxes’ basi-
cally given superiority, which arises from a higher abatement efficiency. 
 
 
6. Original vs. modified Weitzman-rule 
 
Finally, one can gain further insights through opposing the original Weitzman-rule to 
the modified rule for an asymmetric Cournot Duopoly derived in the previous section. 
Weitzman (1974) was the first to compare the performance of emission standards and 
taxes against the background of uncertain control costs on behalf of the EPA, presum-
ing symmetric firms engaging in perfect competition.39 He came to the result, that stan-
dards should be preferred to taxes whenever the marginal damage costs run steeper 
than the minimised aggregate marginal control costs )( minµ>β .40 The reason for the 
minimised aggregate control cost function ( )u,VCCmin , which results from solving 
 
[24] { } ( ) ( )( ) ,VEMEM.t.su,vccxCCmin CNi eieixi, =−+∑evx  
 
                                                 
38
 Clearly, given that µ<β  taxes dominate standards independently of [ ]uVar . 
39
 Weitzman (1974) also incorporated tradable licences into the comparative analysis of instruments which 
are however not treated within the present paper for the reasons set forth in the introduction. 
40
 In deriving this policy rule, Weitzman did not distinguish between different abatement options. Yet, 
Heuson (2008) showed that the original Weitzman-rule can be generalised for the case of two abatement 
options. 
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to be relevant for the original Weitzman-rule is that both standards and taxes accom-
plish V at minimised aggregate control costs when market power and asymmetry of  
the firms are ruled out (see Heuson, 2008).41 
The comparison of the original and modified rule discovers two main differences. 
Firstly, it is straightforward to show that minµ>µ .42 Secondly, of course there is no dis-
parity between standards and taxes w.r.t. the abatement efficiency in the original 
Weitzman-setting, so there the instruments’ ranking solely depends on their costs of 
uncertainty. Hence it becomes evident that within the original setting standards are the 
optimal choice for a larger range of values referred to β  opposite to the asymmetric 
Cournot duopoly and thus  
 
Proposition 4: Both market power and asymmetry of the firms shifts the instruments’ 
relative performance in favour of taxes compared to the original Weitzman setting. 
 
With the immediate consequence: 
 
Proposition 5: Applying the original Weitzman-rule to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly 
comprises the risk of a suboptimal instrument choice. 
 
Apparently, this risk solely refers to erroneously choosing standards instead of taxes 
which comes to pass whenever [ ] min2C2 uVar2 µ>β>φ∆µ+µ . An aberrant implemen-
tation of taxes implying [ ]uVar2 2C2min φ∆µ+µ>β>µ  is impossible, for the reason that 
minµ>µ  and [ ] 0uVar2 2C2 >φ∆µ . 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In almost every actual emission control setting the environmental policy agency (EPA) 
is confronted with two kinds of complications appearing simultaneously when it pursues 
the goal of welfare maximisation: On the one hand, the polluting firms nearly always 
exhibit at least some market power. On the other hand, the EPA is indeed never 
equipped with all the information needed for reaching the full resolution of distortions 
with environmental policy instruments, whereas information problems focus particularly 
on the firms’ cost functions. The environmental economic theory so far has admittedly 
detected that both complications influence the optimal design and choice of conven-
tional instruments decisively, however to date it failed to analyse their mutual impact. 
The present paper contributes to overcome this default. It analyses the welfare proper-
ties of two frequently used emission control instruments – standards and taxes – within 
a static partial framework against the background of uncertain emission control costs 
from the EPA’s perspective and assumes concurrently that the polluting firms constitute 
an asymmetric Cournot duopoly. 
                                                 
41
 More precisely, the output shortage costs of price taking firms coincide with the associated aggregate 
costs, which guarantees that the firms abate efficiently from a welfare point of view. Beyond, the inherent 
inefficiency of standards does not appear when polluters are symmetric. 
42
 The causes for this relation are rather technical and thus not exposed in detail at this point. For this 
purpose see appendix A14 which also contains the proof. 
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The main insight is that the combined emergence of cost uncertainty, market power 
and asymmetry of firms indeed plays a crucial role for the optimal instrument choice. 
Hence, the renowned policy rule derived by Weitzman (1974), which tells whether to 
implement standards or taxes when control costs are uncertain under the premise that 
the polluting firms are symmetric and engage in perfect competition, might give wrong 
suggestions within this setting. The paper provides an adequate modification of the 
original Weitzman-rule which guarantees the optimal instrument choice. It is shown that 
market power as well as asymmetry of the firms shifts the relative performance of in-
struments in favour of taxes compared to the original Weitzman-setting. A further result 
is that the basically given superiority of taxes in case of asymmetric polluters can be 
annihilated by the Weitzman-effect when the degree of uncertainty is sufficiently high. 
Thus the latter directly influences the optimal instrument choice, contrary to the original 
setting. Needless to say both instruments fail at achieving first best, even in the ab-
sence of uncertainty. 
As a matter of course, the specificity of the model demands caution in adopting these 
findings to any actual regulation scenario. Yet, Weitzman (1974) weakened this caveat 
by arguing that the presumed linearity of the aggregate marginal control cost and dam-
age cost function allows for interpreting the results as an approximation for more gen-
eral functions – provided that the feasible value range of the random variable is suffi-
ciently small. For a critical discussion of that point see Malcomson (1978) and Weitz-
man (1978). 
Clearly, there are much more combinations of information problems and market forms 
left which could serve as basis for the comparative analysis of conventional environ-
mental policy instruments. Though, future research should especially focus on those 
combinations which promise essentially new interdependencies between the complica-
tions under regard. One interesting option is to investigate imperfectly competitive mar-
kets featuring price competition, which is well known to exhibit a completely different 
dimension of strategic interaction. Beyond, an important task would be to incorporate 
the instrument of tradable emission licences into this field of research, which is increas-
ingly used in practical environmental policy. 
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Appendices 
 
Some of the results listed below presume the parameter restrictions guaranteeing the 
inner solution. However, as the handling of the latter is very cumbersome but yields no 
further insights the respective proofs will be neglected. 
 
 
Appendix A1: Properties of the unregulated CNE 
 
The second order condition of [1] is fulfilled as the Hessian of the firms’ profit  
  
( ) 





−
−−
=
pi
10
0b21
v,xH eiii       2,1i =∀  
 
is strictly negative definite. 
 
 
The firms’ output response functions show a linear form, decrease in the rival’s output 
and thus guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the unregulated CNE: 
 
( ) jiji xb21
b
b21
a
xrx
+
−
+
ζ−
=       ji,2,1j,i ≠=∀  
 
Note that there is no strategic interaction w.r.t. the end-of-pipe effort, which is zero in 
the absence of regulation. 
 
 
Appendix A2: Second order condition for the welfare maximising allocation 
 
It is straightforward to show that the Hessian of the welfare function 
 
( )



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




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β−β−−βεβε
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,H
22
22
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is strictly negative definite and thus the solution of [2] is a global maximum. Of course, 
since [2] and [3] are equivalent the solution of [3] is necessarily a global minimum. 
 
 
Appendix A3: Unregulated CNE and allocative inefficiency of production 
 
Setting up the difference of the firms’ marginal production costs given the output of the 
unregulated CNE yields 
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 ( ) −∂∂
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11 xx
111 xxcp ( ) CN
22 xx
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=
∂∂ ( ) 0
b1
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+
ζ−ζ
=  
 
as per assumption 21 ζ>ζ . 
 
Producing efficiently would thus require firm 1 to decrease and firm 2 to increase the 
output. 
 
 
Appendix A4: Properties of the standard regulated CNE  
 
The second order condition for [4] is fulfilled because the Hessian of the associated 
Lagrangian  
 
 
( ) 




 +
=
10
0b21
v,xH eiiqi       2,1i =∀  
 
is strictly positive definite. 
 
Beyond, the existence and uniqueness of the standard regulated CNE applies due to 
the firms’ response functions concerning output and end-of-pipe abatement being lin-
ear and decreasing in the rival’s output level: 
 
( ) ( ) j22 iji xb21
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Appendix A5: Properties of the tax regulated CNE  
 
Considering the Hessian of the firms’ compliance costs under taxation 
 
 
( ) 




 +
=
10
0b21
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which is strictly positive definite and seeing that the firms’ response functions 
 
 
( ) jiji xb21
b
b21
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+
−
+
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are linear and decrease in the rival’s output (in case of ( )t,xrx ji ) yields the same results 
as A4. 
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Appendix A6: Optimal standard – second order condition and explicit solution  
 
Due to 
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total costs are strictly convex in q which is why the optimal standard  
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yields a global minimum.  
 
 
Appendix A7: Optimal tax – second order condition and explicit solution 
 
Due to  
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total costs are strictly convex in t which is why the optimal tax 
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yields a global minimum.  
 
 
Appendix A8: Instruments’ total cost difference 
 
Computing [12] for the specified functions gives 
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Appendix A9: Progress of the functions in figure 2 
 
Clearly, as the firms use the identical end-of-pipe technology, their according marginal 
costs correspond to each other: 
 
 
( ) eieieie vvvcc +γ=∂∂       2,1i =∀  
 
For the reason that the firms’ marginal costs of production show the same slope, the 
marginal costs of abatement via output reduction necessarily coincide for both firms as 
well: 
 
 ( ) ,xi2iixi vb21xxcc ε
+
=ε∂∂−       2,1i =∀  
 
Computing the aggregate marginal control costs w.r.t. firm i’s output decrease pro-
duces 
 
( ) ( )( )
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and reveals additionally that 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) .0b3b41
b31b1
xCCxCC 22
2
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1
x
1
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2
x
2
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The aggregate marginal costs of firm 2’s output reduction are higher than the one of 
firm 1:  
 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) .0b1
b
xxCCxxCC 2111x122x2 >
+ε
ζ−ζ
=ε∂∂−−ε∂∂−  
 
The aggregate marginal costs of output reduction run above the according costs occur-
ring on the firms’ level: 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) =ε∂∂−−ε∂∂− iixiiixi xxccxxCC  
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) [ ]CNixi2
x
ijii em;0vfor0
b31b1
vb31b12abab
∈>
ε++
+++ζ+ζ−−ζε−ε
=   
          .ji,2,1j,i ≠=∀  
 
Apparently, all the marginal cost functions described above feature a linear progress. 
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Appendix A10: Allocative inefficiency in the tax and standard regulated CNE 
 
Setting up the difference of the firms’ marginal production costs given the output of the 
tax regulated CNE yields 
 
 ( ) ( ) −∂∂ = txx111 CN11xxcp ( ) ( )txx222 CN22xxcp =∂∂
( ) 0
b1
b 21 >
+
ζ−ζ
=  
 
as per assumption 21 ζ>ζ  
 
which proves that taxation leaves the allocative inefficiency emerging in the unregu-
lated CNE unchanged – independently of the tax rate. 
 
The difference in the marginal production costs occurring in the standard regulated 
CNE 
 
( ) ( ) −∂∂ = qxx111 CN11xxcp ( ) ( )qxx222 CN22xxcp =∂∂
( )( ) 0
b1
b
2
21
2
>
ε++
ζ−ζε+
=  
 
 
shows that the allocative inefficiency of production is not correlated with q. The com-
parison of the marginal production costs’ differences w.r.t. the standard and tax regu-
lated CNE  
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proves that standards increase the allocative inefficiency of production compared to 
taxes respectively the unregulated CNE. 
 
 
Appendix A11: Instrument specific marginal aggregate control cost function  
 
Computing the left and right hand side of [13] for the specified functions yields similarly 
 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) Vb31b312
a2bVMCC 2
21 µ+
ε+++
ζ−ζ−ε
+γφ= , 
 
whereas ( ) ( )( )22
22
b31
b21b31
ε++
ε+++
=φ  and ( ) ( )( ) ,b312
b21b31
22
22
ε++
ε+++
=µ  
 
and thus proves that both ( )Vq  and ( )Vt  induce the same (marginal) aggregate control 
costs. 
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Appendix A12: Shape of the random aggregate marginal control cost function  
 
Computing [13] for the specified functions and taking into account the additive shock to 
the end-of-pipe control costs one obtains 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) Vb31b312
a2b
uu,VMCC 2
21 µ+
ε+++
ζ−ζ−ε
+φ+γ=   
 
which proves that ( )u,VMCC  runs linearly and is affected by u in an additive manner as 
well. For the specification of φ  and µ  see A11. 
 
 
Appendix A13: Progress of the functions in figure 3 
 
The damage costs as a function of V read: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2CNCN VEM21VEMVDC −β+−α= . 
Computing the according marginal cost function 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )VEMVDCVMDC CN −β+α=∂⋅∂−=  
 
proves the latter’s linear progress. 
 
For the linearity of ( )u,VMCC  see A12. Calculating the aggregation of the firm specific 
marginal control costs for the specified functions results in 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) V
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+
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For the inner solution it holds that ( ) ( )u,Vtu,VMCC > . Furthermore applies 
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Finally note that the slopes of ( )u,VMCC  and ( )u,Vt  are positively correlated, because 
they are determined by the same parameters (see above) entering in the identical di-
rection: 
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All in all, the relation between ( )u,VMCC  and ( )u,Vt  is an immediate consequence of 
the difference between the firms’ and the aggregate marginal control costs w.r.t. output 
reduction depicted in figure 2: The aggregate marginal cost function runs above the 
one of the firms, yet for increasing abatement effort both functions converge.  
 
 
Appendix A14: minµvs.µ  
 
Solving [24] for ( )evx,  and inserting results into ( ) ( )( )∑ +i eieixi u,vccxCC  yields 
( )u,VCCmin , whose first derivative w.r.t. V turns out to be 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ,Vb21b312
a2b
uu,VMCC min2
21minmin µ+
ε+++
ζ−ζ−ε
+φ+γ=  
 
whereas ( )( )( )2min b21b31
b65b1
ε+++
++
=φ  and 2min 2b42
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ε++
+
=µ . 
 
Comparing ( )u,VMCCmin  and ( )u,VMCC  yields 
 
w.r.t. the level 
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2
0V
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which is strictly positive within the inner solution. 
 
w.r.t. the slope 
 
( )
( )( ) 0b31b212
b
222
2
min <
ε++ε++
ε
=µ−µ . 
 
So ( )u,VMCCmin  runs on a higher level opposite to ( )u,VMCC  but exhibits a smaller 
slope. The causes for this relation become clear through contemplating the progression 
of the associated aggregate control cost functions within V’s feasible value range for 
the inner solution: 
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Figure 4: Minimised vs. instrument specific aggregate control costs 
 
First of all it, is easy to see that the aggregate control costs induced by standards 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )∑ +i eCNieCNixi u,u,Vqvccu,VqxCC  run parallel above the ones induced by 
taxes ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ]( )∑ +i eCNieCNixi u,u,u,VtvccEu,VtxCC  at a distance of C∆  – owed to [13], 
both functions show the same slope which increases in V. Yet, standards cause higher 
control costs than taxes given any V as a result of their disadvantage concerning the 
abatement efficiency (see [12] and proposition 1).  
Clearly, as both standards and taxes hurt the conditions for efficient abatement, the 
minimised aggregate control costs ( )u,VCCmin  range on a lower level compared to the 
associated costs of standards and taxes (the explicit proof is in turn omitted for the fa-
miliar reasons). 
The crux for ( )u,VMCC  to grow faster than ( )u,VMCCmin , i.e. minµ>µ , is the following: 
As demonstrated in figure 2, the gap between the aggregate marginal control costs 
w.r.t. output shortage and the firms’ costs shrinks with increasing abatement effort. 
Thus, the higher V, the less impact has the abatement inefficiency coming along with 
standards and taxes. Consequently, the instruments’ and the minimised aggregate 
control costs converge as V tends to CNEM , the maximal overall abatement effort. This 
in turn has two kinds of implications: Firstly, the minimised cost function runs steeper 
than the instruments’ cost function and thus necessarily ( )u,VMCCmin  possesses a 
higher level than ( )u,VMCC . Secondly, the convergence of the cost functions requires 
that their slopes assimilate as well for growing V and so minµ>µ . 
 
 
 
 
 
aggregate control costs induced by standards 
aggregate control costs induced by taxes 
minimised aggregate control costs 
 
CNEM  
V  
aggregate 
control costs 
 26 
References 
 
Adar, Z. and Griffin, J. M. (1976): “Uncertainty and the choice of pollution control in-
struments,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 3, 178-188. 
 
Barnett, A. H. (1980): “The Pigouvian tax rule under monopoly,” American Economic 
Review 70, 1037-1041. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. (1969): “External diseconomies, corrective taxes and market struc-
ture,” American Economic Review 59, 174-177. 
 
Ebert, U. (1992): “Pigouvian tax and market structure: The case of oligopoly and differ-
ent abatement technologies,” Finanzarchiv 49, 154-166. 
 
Helfand, G. E. (1991): “Standards versus standards: The effects of different pollution 
restrictions,” American Economic Review 81, 622-634. 
 
Heuson, C. (2008): “Weitzman revisited: Emission standards vs. taxes with uncertain 
control costs and market power of polluting firms,” Universität Augsburg, Institut für 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe Nr. 299.  
 
Malcomson, J. M. (1978): “Prices vs. quantities: A critical note on the use of approxi-
mations,” Review of Economic Studies 45, 203-207. 
 
Requate, T. (1993a): “Pollution control in a Cournot Duopoly via taxes or permits,” 
Journal of Economics 58, 255-291. 
 
Requate, T. (1993b): “Pollution control under imperfect competition: Asymmetric Ber-
trand duopoly with linear technologies,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 149, 415-442. 
 
Requate, T. (2005): “Environmental policy under imperfect competition – a survey,” 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics: Economics Working 
Paper, No. 2005-12. 
 
Simpson (1995): “Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly,” Environmental and 
Resource Economics 6, 359-369. 
 
Tisato, P. (1994): “Pollution standards vs. charges under uncertainty,” Environmental 
and Resource Economics 4, 295-304. 
 
Weitzman, M. L. (1974): “Prices vs. quantities,” Review of Economic Studies 41, 477-
491. 
 
Weitzman, M. L. (1978): “Reply to “Prices vs. quantities: A critical note on the use of 
approximations” by James M. Malcomson,” Review of Economic Studies 45, 209-
210. 
